Prospect theory
Kahneman and Tversky's 1979 model of decisions under risk: people judge outcomes as gains or losses from a reference point, feel losses more strongly than equal gains, and overweight small probabilities.

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Expected utility theory, the standard model of choice under risk, values final wealth and weighs each outcome by its probability[4]. In 1979 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky showed choices that violate it in regular ways, and proposed prospect theory as an alternative[1].
A 2010 report prepared for the SEC calls it one of the foundations of behavioral finance[2]. Loss aversion is one part of it; the theory also covers how people weigh chances[1].
How it works
Prospect theory splits a choice into two phases[4]. In editing, people simplify the options. Above all, they code outcomes as gains or losses from a reference point, usually the current position, though the wording of a choice and a person’s expectations can move it[4]. In evaluation, they pick the option with the highest value[4].
Two scales do the valuing[1]:
- A value function over gains and losses: normally concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and steeper for losses than for gains[1].
- Decision weights in place of probabilities: generally lower than the probabilities, except in the range of low probabilities, which are overweighted[1].
The evidence came from hypothetical choices put to students and university faculty, with amounts in Israeli pounds; the median family’s net monthly income was about 3,000[4]. In one pair of problems, each answered by 95 people[4]:
- 80% preferred 3,000 for sure to an 80% chance of 4,000[4].
- 92% preferred an 80% chance of losing 4,000 to a sure loss of 3,000[4].
Flip the signs and the preference flips: the authors called this the reflection effect, risk aversion for gains paired with risk seeking for losses[4].
A Financial Conduct Authority paper sums up the four combinations[3]:
| Chance | Gains | Losses |
|---|---|---|
| High | avoid risk to lock in a sure gain | take risks in the hope of avoiding a loss |
| Low | seek risk, overpay for a lottery | avoid risk, over-insure small risks |
Example
Say a trader holds two positions and must decide on each now.
- Position A: close for +$300, or hold for an 80% chance of +$400 and a 20% chance of $0. Holding is worth 0.8 × $400 = +$320 on average.
- Position B: close for −$300, or hold for an 80% chance of −$400 and a 20% chance of $0. Holding is worth 0.8 × −$400 = −$320 on average.
The pattern in Kahneman and Tversky’s problems runs one way on A and the other way on B: the sure +$300 on the winner, the gamble on the loser. Each of those choices gives up $20 of expected value.
Watch out
The 1979 data were hypothetical choices, and the authors discussed what that method can and cannot show[4].
Small probabilities cut both ways. Overweighting them can make both insurance and gambling attractive[1].
The theory describes; it does not prescribe. It began as a critique of expected utility theory as a description of behavior[1].
Sources
- ResearchEconometric SocietyProspect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk (Kahneman & Tversky, Econometrica 47(2), 1979)Checked November 9, 2026
- RegulatorU.S. Securities and Exchange CommissionBehavioral Patterns and Pitfalls of U.S. Investors (Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, for the SEC, August 2010)Checked November 9, 2026
- RegulatorFinancial Conduct AuthorityApplying behavioural economics at the Financial Conduct Authority (Occasional Paper No. 1, April 2013)Checked November 9, 2026
- ResearchMIT (course copy of the journal article)Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk (Kahneman & Tversky, Econometrica 47(2), 1979, full text)Checked November 9, 2026
