Disposition effect
The tendency to sell positions that show a profit too early and to keep losing positions too long, hoping to get back to break-even. Named by Shefrin and Statman (1985).

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Closing a winner feels like being right. Closing a loser feels like admitting a mistake. Brokerage records show what that difference does: winners get sold sooner than losers[1].
The pattern matters because it is about exits, not ideas. Two traders with the same entries can end up with opposite results depending on which positions they let run.
How it works
Hersh Shefrin and Meir Statman named the disposition effect in 1985[1]. They started from what Kahneman and Tversky had described as an aversion to realizing losses and set it in a wider framework: a general disposition to sell winners too early and hold losers too long[3]. Their framework adds mental accounting, regret aversion, self-control and tax considerations, and they argued that taxes alone cannot explain the observed patterns[3].
Terrance Odean tested the idea on trading records from 1987 through 1993 for 10,000 accounts at a large US discount broker[1]. He compared two shares:
- proportion of gains realized = realized gains ÷ (realized gains + paper gains);
- proportion of losses realized = realized losses ÷ (realized losses + paper losses).
Over the full year, these investors realized 14.8% of the gains available to them and 9.8% of the losses[1]. The gap held after controlling for portfolio rebalancing and for the higher trading costs of low-priced stocks[1].
The choice also cost them. Winners that were sold went on to beat the losers that were kept: over the following year their average excess return was about 3.4 percentage points higher[1]. December was the exception, with tax-motivated selling of losers most evident in that month[1].
A 2010 report prepared for the SEC lists the disposition effect among common investment mistakes. It sums up Odean’s result as the opposite of what the sellers intended[2].
Example
Say a trader closes 10 trades with the same entries and position size.
- On the 5 winners the trader exits early, at an average of +$200 each: +$1,000.
- On the 5 losers the trader waits for a return to break-even. It does not come, and the trader closes them at an average of −$400 each: −$2,000.
- Net result: −$1,000, with a 50% win rate.
Swap the two sizes, winners at +$400 and losers at −$200, and the same 50% win rate gives +$1,000. The hit rate did not change. The exits did.
Watch out
Break-even is the holder’s reference point, not a level the market knows. In Odean’s sample, the losers people held on to did worse over the next year than the winners they sold[1].
Not every sale of a winner is the bias. Rebalancing is a real reason, which is why Odean controlled for it and still found the pattern[1]. Taxes point the other way, because realizing losses can lower a tax bill, which is why December looks different in Odean’s data[1].
The effect is a tendency across many accounts, not a rule for every trader. Odean’s figures describe one broker’s customers in 1987–1993[1].
Sources
- ResearchTerrance Odean, UC Berkeley Haas (author copy)Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses? (Odean, Journal of Finance 53(5), 1998)Checked November 9, 2026
- RegulatorU.S. Securities and Exchange CommissionBehavioral Patterns and Pitfalls of U.S. Investors (Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, for the SEC, August 2010)Checked November 9, 2026
- ResearchWiley (The Journal of Finance)The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence (Shefrin & Statman, Journal of Finance 40(3), 1985)Checked November 9, 2026
